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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress amended the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”) 
in 1970 to create a fiduciary duty among investment advisers with 
respect to compensation for services provided, and a private right of 
action for security holders to enforce that duty.1 Thirty-four years 
later, security holders of several mutual funds brought an action 
against the funds’ investment adviser, alleging that the adviser’s 
compensation was excessive in violation Section 36(b) of the ICA.2 
The Seventh Circuit departed from standard used in other circuits, 
and emphasized only the candor of the adviser to the board when 
determining whether or not the adviser’s compensation was lawful 
under the ICA.3  The court based its decision on the competition of 
the mutual fund market and the sophistication of individual investors 
to keep an adviser’s compensation at an efficient level,4 while the 
precedent stated that investment advisers do not in reality compete 
with each other for advisory contracts with mutual funds.5  In light of 
the circuit split,6 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
J.D. candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 927 *2d Cir. 1982); 15 
U.S.C.A. § 80a–35(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 2. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I), aff’d, 527 F.3d 
627 (7th Cir. 2008) reh’g en banc denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
1579 (2009). 
 3. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929. 
 6. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones III) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (indicating the decision created a circuit split). 
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which standard should be used to determine whether a mutual fund’s 
fees are excessive under § 36(b). 
II. FACTS 
Harris Associates (“Harris”) is an investment advisement 
company responsible for managing a group of mutual funds 
collectively known as the Oakmark complex of funds.7 Harris’s 
compensation for managing the funds investment adviser was 
determined annually by Oakmark’s board of trustees.8 In setting 
Harris’ compensation, the board examined “the fund’s performance, 
the services Harris provided,” the fees Harris charged other clients, 
the fees other investment advisers charged to manage similar funds.9 
The board calculated the fees for all three funds as one percent or less 
of the funds’ total assets at the end of the preceding month, and 
included breakpoints, or a fee reduction when assets grew above a 
certain amount.10 For example, the eponymous fund of the complex 
agreed to pay Harris “1% of the first $2 billion of the [f]und’s assets, 
0.9% for the next $1 billion, 0.8% for the next $2 billion, and then 
0.75% for assets in excess of $5 billion.”11 The other two funds at issue 
had similar fee schedules.12 These fees were “roughly the same (in 
both level and breakpoints) as those that other funds of similar size 
and investment goals pay their advisers.”13 Harris also provided 
information for the fees that they charged “institutional clients”—
clients not affiliated with a mutual fund—which included fee 
percentages and breakpoints with significantly lower amounts,14 
sometimes even half of the fees they charged mutual funds.15 
The board of Oakmark which approved the compensation scheme 
was comprised of ten members, several of whom maintained business 
relationships with Harris.16 Victor Morgenstern previously worked for 
 7. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629; Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1. 
 8. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at *2. (delineating exact percentages and breakpoints for the other two funds, 
Global and Equity. ). 
 13. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II). 
 14. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1 (“For institutional clients with investment strategies 
similar to Oakmark’s the percentages ranged from 0.075% to 0.35%, with breakpoints ranging 
from $15 million to $500 million.”). 
 15. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting)(Jones 
III). 
 16. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1. 
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Harris and retired in 2001; John Raitt left the board to become CEO 
and President of Harris in 2003; and Peter Voss was CEO and 
President of Harris’s parent company.17 Morgenstern maintained 
social and business relationships with employees at Harris, and the 
other board members also had personal, social, and non-fund business 
relationships with Harris employees.18 These relationships raised an 
issue of whether the board had set Harris’ compensation in an truly 
arm’s-length transaction.19 
The plaintiff shareholders brought derivative suits on behalf of the 
mutual funds in August of 2004, claiming that Harris had violated § 
36(b) of the ICA.20 The shareholders claimed that Harris breached its 
fiduciary duty under § 36(b) by (1) charging the Oakmark funds at a 
substantially higher rate than institutional clients; (2) failing to 
recognize cost-savings from economies of scale in determining the fee 
schedule; and (3) violating the ICA requirement of arm’s-length 
dealings with the Oakmark board.21  The District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois applied the Gartenberg test and 
concluded that the fees were not excessive because they reflected the 
rates of other mutual funds.22 In granting the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, the district court also concluded that most of the 
violations asserted by the plaintiffs were not within the scope of the 
private right of action created for shareholders under § 36(b) because 
the defendant’s actions did not constitute an actual conflict of interest 
resulting in harm to the shareholders.23  The plaintiffs appealed from 
this grant of summary judgment.24 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress long ago concluded that mutual funds and other 
investment companies required special regulation based on the 
“potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment 
companies.”25 This belief led Congress to pass the Investment 
 17. Id. at *2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at *9–*13. 
 22. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II). 
 23. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *5. 
 24. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629. 
 25. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979), quoted in Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 15, 
2009). 
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Company Act of 1940, which contained multiple provisions designed 
to guard against potential conflicts of interest common to investment 
companies.26 Over time, however, significant growth in the mutual 
fund market rendered the ICA ineffective.27 Congress amended the 
ICA in 1970 to include Securities and Exchange Commission 
proposals, which cited studies that illuminated the existing Act’s 
deficiencies.28 One of the ICA amendments was § 36(b), which creates 
a private right of action to enforce a new fiduciary duty of mutual 
fund advisers when negotiating their fees: 
 
  the investment adviser of a registered investment company 
shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the 
receipt of compensation for services paid by such registered 
investment company  . . . [and a]n action may be brought under 
this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder 
against such adviser . . .  It shall not be necessary to allege or 
prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct and 
the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of 
fiduciary duty.29 
 
Several circuits have looked to the legislative history and textual 
clues of the ICA in an effort to determine the meaning of fiduciary 
duty.30 Although no consistent definition has emerged, in Green v. 
Fund Asset Management, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
examined the structure of the fiduciary duty created by § 36(b) and 
concluded that  it was  more narrow than the common law doctrine of 
fiduciary duty for two reasons.31 First, the ICA limits damages claimed 
from the breach of fiduciary duty to the actual damages paid to the 
recipient and limits recovery to one year prior to the initiation of the 
suit.32 Second, the plaintiff has the burden to prove breach, a 
significant departure from the common law requirement placing the 
burden on the fiduciary to justify its conduct.33 These conditions 
ensured that the federal cause of action created by § 36(b) would be 
 26. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984). 
 27. Id. at 537. 
 28. Id. at 537–538. 
 29. 15 U.S.C.A.§ 80a–35(b) (West 2003). 
 30. See Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that § 
36(b) of the ICA was not meant to revolutionize the industry practice, but provide a narrow 
federal remedy); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 
1982) (examining failed legislative bills, the Senate Report, and the House Committee Report). 
 31. Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 286 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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more narrow.34 
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, the Second 
Circuit outlined what would become the generally-accepted standard 
for determining whether an investment adviser had violated its 
fiduciary duty under § 36(b). 35  This standard became known as the 
Gartenberg test, which considers: 
  
 [W]hether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range 
of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of 
all the surrounding circumstances. . . . To be guilty of a 
violation of § 36(b), therefore, the adviser-manager must 
charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no 
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not 
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.36 
 
Gartenberg set out a number of non-exclusive factors to be 
considered when examining whether the fees were excessive: the 
similarity of fees to those charged at other mutual funds; the 
comparability of fees charged to institutional clients with similar 
services; the cost to the adviser to provide services to the fund; the 
nature and quality of the services, including the historical 
performance of the fund; the economies of scale the adviser gains as 
the fund’s assets increase; the volume of orders from the investors 
that need to be processed; and the conduct, expertise, and level of 
information that trustees of the fund possessed.37 After examining 
these and other factors, the court must determine if the fees fall 
“within the range” of fees possibly arrived at after arm’s-length 
negotiations.38 
IV. HOLDING 
To determine whether Harris breached its fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit analyzed each of the claims filed under 
the ICA.39 The court first determined that several ICA sections 
implicated by the plaintiff’s claims were not applicable because the 
court found that “although § 36(b) creates a private right of action, 
 34. See id. (discussing the limited damages, shifted burden of proof, as well as the Senate 
report that accompanied the act). 
 35. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I). 
 38. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
 39. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II). 
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the other sections we have mentioned do not.”40 The plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, wished to include these violations as evidence of the 
failure of the board to negotiate at arm’s-length and establish efficient 
fees.41 The plaintiffs alleged that the fund violated the ICA by failing 
to ensure at least forty percent of the board members were 
disinterested in their relationships with the adviser.42 The plaintiffs 
claimed that due to the fund’s failure to reveal the financial links 
between its trustees and adviser,43 the adviser’s compensation was not 
controlled by a majority of disinterested trustees.44 The Seventh 
Circuit made “short work” of these claims, concluding that none of 
the alleged violations had a private right of action attached to them 
and further that there had been no actual violation of the sections.45 
The court analyzed the status of Trustee Morgenstern and decided 
that although Morgenstern was an “interested” party, seven of the 
nine trustees were deemed “disinterested” parties—enough for a 
majority and above the required forty percent.46 The court declared 
that although the “[p]laintiffs ask us to suppose that Morgenstern 
possessed some Svengali-like sway over the other trustees, so that his 
presence in the room was enough to spoil their decisions,” interested 
trustees retained the right to speak and discuss votes on the contract, 
and the board would have approved the compensation even without 
counting his vote.47 
Next, the court turned to “the main event”—the plaintiffs § 36(b) 
claim that the adviser’s fees were excessive.48 The Seventh Circuit, 
however, specifically disavowed the Gartenberg test.49 The court 
declared that the only applicable standard was that “[a] fiduciary must 
make full disclosure and play no tricks [on the board of trustees] but 
is not subject to a cap on compensation.”50 The court declared that the 
markets would establish the adviser’s compensation.51 By presuming 
that the mutual fund markets are efficient, the court held that the 
 40. Id. 
 41. Brief of Petitioners at 12–13, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 10, 2009). 
 42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–10(a) (West 2003). 
 43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–33(b). 
 44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–15(c) . 
 45. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629. 
 46. Id. at 629–30. 
 47. Id. at 630. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 632. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (“The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), 
rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.”) 
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only cause of action under § 36(b) is for a failure to make full 
disclosure.52 The Seventh Circuit held that the term “fiduciary duty” 
invoked the law of trusts, which required “candor in negotiation, and 
honesty in performance” but allowed fiduciaries the ability to 
negotiate their compensation without judicial scrutiny.53 
Given the large number of mutual funds, the court decided that 
competition sufficiently protected investors from excessive fees.54 The 
evidence that Harris charged lower fees to institutional clients was 
dismissed based on the court’s observation that “[d]ifferent clients call 
for different commitments of time.”55 Finally, because the plaintiffs 
never alleged that Harris deceived the funds’s board of trustees, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the compensation should stand and 
affirmed the district court’s decision.56 
The case came up on appeal for a rehearing en banc, and when 
rehearing was denied Judge Posner dissented.57  The dissent argued 
that the court erred in rejecting Gartenberg, and the majority 
analogized the circumstances of mutual fund compensation too 
closely to other industries that do not face the same conflicts of 
interest.58 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Seventh Circuit’s departure from the Gartenberg standard is 
troubling. The Gartenberg standard has been an accepted part of 
American law for more than twenty years, and has been relied on by 
mutual fund companies, other circuits and Securities and Exchange 
Commission regulators. Jones v. Harris was the first decision to 
disapprove the Gartenberg standard; meanwhile, other circuits have 
made a “slew of positive citations” supporting Gartenberg.59 The SEC 
also approved the factors detailed in Gartenberg by incorporating the 
factors into SEC regulations,60 creating a history of reliance on this 
analysis in the mutual fund industry. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. f). 
 54. Id. at 634. 
 55. Id. at 634–35. 
 56. Id. at 635. 
 57. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting) (Jones 
III). 
 58. Id. at 730–733. 
 59. Id. at 729. 
 60. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25, at 
23–24. 
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision is that it rests on what Judge 
Posner called “an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination.”61 
Jones v. Harris stated that “just as plaintiffs are skeptical of 
Gartenberg because it relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical 
about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”62 The 
opinion further noted that the model of board approval that mutual 
funds use to determine adviser compensation is similar to that of 
large corporations, and that this model is not subject to judicial 
oversight in that context.63 The court’s decision ultimately put its faith 
in the presumed sophistication of individual investors to keep 
investment adviser fees competitive by shopping around for mutual 
funds with lower fees.64 However, this analysis all relies on the court’s 
presumption that the mutual fund market is efficient. This reasoning 
ignores a body of literature indicating that mutual funds boards’ 
conflicts of interest defeat the boards’ incentives to bargain for lower 
compensation.65 By establishing a principle similar to the business 
judgment rule, the court ignored the fact that “although mutual funds 
have the trappings of typical corporations, their external management 
structure sets them apart.”66 Mutual fund boards are often composed 
of interested parties, semi-interested parties,67 or advisers of other 
mutual funds, resulting in a truly “captive” board more interested in 
creating profits for the adviser than the fund.68 
The new standard suggested by the Seventh Circuit seemingly 
contradicts the purpose of the statute. Section 36(b) of the ICA 
specifically provides that the board’s approval “shall be given such 
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the 
circumstances.”69 This seems to contemplate a thorough test, such as 
Gartenberg, rather than the deferential standard outlined in Jones v. 
 61. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 62. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II). 
 63. Id. at 632–33. 
 64. Id. at 634–35. 
 65. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 66. Emily Johnson, Note, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe for 
Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 151 (2009) (discussing the fact that the close nexus between 
investment advisers and the mutual fund board undermines the any incentive of the board to 
establish meaningful limits on the adviser). 
 67. A review of the relationships in this case set out in the district court opinion, Jones v. 
Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I), shows that even the 
“uninterested” board members had close ties to Harris Assocs. through other members of the 
board or other business arrangements, so close as to make them probably all excessively 
sympathetic to the advisers they are bargaining with at “arm’s length.” 
 68. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730–32  (comparing investment fund advisor compensation to 
executive compensation). 
 69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b)(2) (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
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Harris. However, under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, the § 36(b) 
fiduciary duty would be so narrow that meeting it would require no 
more than compliance with other sections of the ICA, effectively 
rendering the section redundant.70 This standard seems unlikely to be 
affirmed on appeal. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
Petitioners’ Arguments 
The shareholders presented two arguments urging the Court to 
overturn the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The first argument was that 
the “fiduciary duty” imposed on mutual fund investment advisers by § 
36(b) is a two-prong requirement: an obligation to disclose “all 
material facts relating to” compensation and an obligation that the 
compensation they receive be fair and negotiated for “in an arm’s-
length transaction.”71  In the second argument the shareholders attack 
the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on a competitive market to keep fees 
efficient. Specifically, they claim mutual funds do not operate in a 
competitive environment and the ICA was designed with this in 
mind.72 
First, the shareholders argued that the fiduciary duty provided for 
in § 36(b) requires investment advisers to do two things: disclose 
information about their compensation and negotiate for their 
compensation in an arm’s length transaction. This standard is an 
expansion of Gartenberg as currently applied because it incorporates 
more evidence into the analysis of objective fairness and also 
incorporates other procedural requirements of the ICA into the 
private action.  In support of their argument, the shareholders point 
to the text of § 36(b) of the ICA. They point out that § 36(b) uses the 
term “fiduciary duty,” a term which had a “set” common law meaning. 
According to the comments to the Restatement of Trusts, common 
law fiduciary duty required both full and accurate disclosure to the 
beneficiary of all material facts of the transaction as well as a 
transaction that is fair to the beneficiary.73 The shareholders argued 
that the Court should presume that the fiduciary duty in § 36(b) is the 
 70. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25, at 
14 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-15(c) and 80b-6). 
 71. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 17. 
 72. Id. at 34. 
 73. Id. at 21–22 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g.). 
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same as the common law fiduciary duty because, according to the 
canons of statutory construction, when Congress incorporates an 
established common law term into a statute, Congress is presumed to 
incorporate the common law meaning of that term.74 The 
shareholders claim that Congress’ intent to incorporate the traditional 
common law trust definition of “fiduciary duty” into § 36(b) of the 
ICA is further supported by the Court’s decision in Pepper v. Litton, 
where the they stated that even where a fiduciary has made full 
disclosure, the court should still closely review it for fairness.75 
Although they disagree with some of the “gloss” that later cases have 
applied to this standard, 76 the petitioners argue that the core of the 
Gartenberg standard correctly incorporates this common law 
foundation where it states: “an adviser breaches its fiduciary duty 
under § 36(b) when it charges a fee that exceeds what could
ained in an arm’s-length transaction”77 
Second, the petitioners claim that the standard applied by the 
Seventh Circuit conflicts with the purpose of the ICA.78 The 
petitioners argue that while the court below looked to the wrong 
situation when incorporating the common law rules surrounding a 
fiduciary duty: it erred by comparing the facts of this case—a captive 
mutual fund—to a situation where a trust is created, rather than an 
ongoing trust relationship.79 Petitioners claim that while a trust is 
created, the parties engage in arms-length bargaining, but an ongoing 
trust relationship triggers additional duties for the fiduciary.80 They 
assert that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that board approval was 
“conclusive” conflicts with the plain language of the ICA stating that 
“director approval should be afforded only ‘such consideration by the 
court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.’”81 In 
their effort to discredit the Seventh Circuit’s new standard, 
Petitioners then attack the Seventh Circuit’s analogies to other 
sources of law applied in the opinion.82 The shareholders claimed that 
the circumstances that mutual funds operate are entirely different 
 74. Id. at 20 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)). 
 75. Id. at 25–28 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)). 
 76. Id. at 33 n. 25. 
 77. Id. at 33. 
 78. Id. at 34. 
 79. Id. at 34–37. 
 80. Id. at 37. 
 81. Id. at 38 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(a)(2)). 
 82. Id. at 40 (stating that the fiduciary duty of a mutual fund adviser is unlike that of a 
lawyer or corporation because in the case of the former conflicts of interest occur much more 
often). 
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utual fund fees in light of the potential for conflicts of 
interest.84 
Respondent’s Arguments 
 standard, which 
the
 
than the other businesses the Seventh Circuit compares, because they 
lack a true competitive market.83 The petitioners point to the avowed 
purposes of the ICA found in the Act’s legislative history and argue 
that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s decision to rely on the market, 
Congress amended the Act because it did not trust markets to 
manage m
Harris makes three arguments in its defense of the district court’s 
decisions.  Notably, the respondent supports a return to the 
Gartenberg standard, and does not support the standard set forth in 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision.85 Instead, Harris’s arguments all 
attempt to support its position under the Gartenberg
 district court used to decide the case.86 
First, Harris attacks the petitioners’ proposed standard using 
textual arguments.87 It focuses on the fact that the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff to prove that they the fee could not have been 
reached at an arm’s-length.88 Respondent rejects the second prong of 
the petitioners’ proposed fiduciary standard, and claims that Congress 
intentionally wrote the ICA in a way that avoided a “reasonableness” 
test.89 It relies on the structure of § 36(b)90 and the Senate’s change in 
the ICA bill from wording that included “reasonableness” to 
“fiduciary duty.”91 Respondent then attacks the first prong of the 
petitioners’ standard by claiming that there is no right of action for 
violations of board procedure in deciding fees92 and notes that 
“[s]ection 36(b) is sharply focused on the question of whether the fees 
themselves were excessive.”93 It argues that under the correct 
Gartenberg standard “the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 41–48. 
 85. See Brief for Respondent at 26, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Aug. 27, 
2009) (lacking any argument supporting the Seventh Circuit’s decision to disapprove of 
Gartenberg). 
 86. Id. at 25–49. 
 87. Id. at 26–32. 
 88. Id. at 28. 
 89. Id. at 32–33. 
 90. See id. (creating a duty for the plaintiffs to prove a breach of fiduciary duty, rather than 
the normal duty for the defendants to prove no breach). 
 91. Id. at 36 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 142–44 (1966)). 
 92. Id. at 44–46.  Both the district and appellate courts applied the same analysis. 
 93. Id. at 44 (citing Migdal v. Rowe Prince Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
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 analysis was undisturbed by the 
appellate court.101 
 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to 
the services rendered and could not have bee
gth bargaining,” to constitute a violation.94 
The respondent’s second argument focuses on the potential policy 
ramifications inherent in the petitioners’ two-prong test: higher fees 
passed on to investors. The respondent claims that the petitioners’ 
two-prong standard would “doom” any mutual fund adviser to a 
trial.95 It argues that the “fairness” (first) prong of the petitioners’ 
proposed standard would be nearly impossible to prove on summary 
judgment because of the possible expert testimony that stated the fees 
“should have been resolved differently.”96 Similarly, Respondent 
asserts that the “fair process” (second) prong would always lead to a 
trial because there would be an issue of fact as to whether some board 
member or another was “interested.”97 The massive costs of litigation 
would force advisers to prepare for potentially far greater liability, 
which would force advisers to charge significantly higher fees to 
investors.98 The respondent contends that “[t]he real advantages to 
itioner’s standard are the benefits that accrue to lawyers.”99 
The respondent puts forth a final argument in the event that the 
Seventh Circuit opinion is overturned. The respondent draws the 
Court’s attention to the district court opinion where the Gartenberg 
standard was applied in the “disproportionately large” manner that 
the respondent supports, and emphasize the fact that the district court 
found “the Gartenberg ‘factors’ all weigh against Petitioners.”100 The 
respondent argues that even if the Supreme Court overturns the 
standard that the Seventh Circuit established when they disapproved 
Gartenberg, the motion for summary judgment should be upheld since 
the district court’s legal and factual
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
This case seems destined for a reversal that addresses the 
applicable standard but affirms the judgment. The vehement dissent 
 94. Id. at 26, (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2nd Cir. 
1982)). 
 95. Id. at 49. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 50. 
 98. Id. at 51. 
 99. Id. at 51. 
 100. Id. at 53. 
 101. Id. at 54–55. 
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choose to affirm the initial entry of summary judgment. 
 
 
by Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc 
makes strong arguments, supported by voluminous academic 
research, that the appellate opinion’s economic reasoning was 
flawed.102 The amicus curiae brief of the Solicitor General also adds 
weight to the petitioners’ arguments for a more encompassing review 
of all the circumstances in a § 36(b) claim rather than the limited 
standard the Seventh Circuit established and a return to a definition 
consistent with SEC regulations that relied on the previous 
circumstances.103 Even the respondent seems prepared for the 
standard to be overturned, as its final argument in its brief reminds 
the Court that they were awarded summary judgment by the district 
court using the Gartenberg standard.104 It is likely that the Supreme 
Court will vacate the new standard created by the Seventh Circuit 
and reaffirm the Gartenberg standard, thus resolving the circuit split 
and restoring consistency across this federal common law issue. While 
the petitioners’ proposed standard expands the narrow action 
established under the ICA too far, by accepting the Seventh Circuit’s 
standard the action is effectively read out of existence. The Court may, 
however, be reluctant to overturn the findings of the tri
 102. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(Jones III). 
 103. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25, 
at 14. 
 104. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 54–55. 
